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Federal Jurisdiction Over Juveniles: Who

Decides?
United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the increase in the number and severity of violent crimes
committed by juveniles, public demand for harsher penalties and proceedings for
young offenders also increases each year.2 Congress has responded to the public
outcry by enacting numerous pieces of legislation that mandate federal juvenile
accountability. This legislation represents a drastic departure from the federal
government's traditional policy of leaving juvenile justice affairs to the states.
One of the many congressional acts in the past decades confers federal
jurisdiction upon prosecution of juveniles who commit serious violent or drug
related crimes if the United States Attorney certifies that the case involves "a
substantial federal interest."3 The various courts of appeals are split on the
question of "who ultimately decides?" Does the United States Attorney make
the ultimate decision, or do the courts have the authority to review when the
decision is contested? As the conflict among the circuits and within the
Missouri Eastern District Court reveals, this question is open to divergent
interpretations.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In the fall of 1996, seventeen year-old J.A.J. was arrested for possession of
1.31 grams of crack cocaine, .94 grams of marijuana, .24 grams of codeine, a .25
caliber semi-automatic handgun, and six rounds of ammunition.4 A federal
grand jury indicted J.A.J. on five counts of juvenile delinquency.'
The United States Attorney certified that J.A.J. was a juvenile, that a
substantial federal interest in the case existed, and that the offenses justified
federal jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032.6 J.A.J. moved to dismiss for

1. 134 F.3d 905 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2388 (1998).
2. Between the 1988 and 1994, the rate of juvenile arrests for violent crimes
increased more than 50% before declining in 1995 and 1996. See HOwARD N. SNYDER
ET AL., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 14 (1996); Fox
Butterfield, After a Decade,Juvenile Crime Begins to Drop, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996,

at Al (2.9% decline in 1995); U.S. Reports Sharp Drop In Violent Youth Crime,N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1997, at A13 (9.2% decline in 1996).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
4. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d at 905-06.
5. Id. at 906. Juvenile delinquency is defined as "violation of a law of the United
States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been a
crime if committed by an adult...." 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
6. United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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lack of federal jurisdiction.7 The Federal District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri dismissed J.A.J.'s motion "with reluctance." 8 The district court
explained that although the state interest appeared to outweigh any federal
interest, once the United States certified that the prosecution of a juvenile
represented a substantial federal interest, "the Court can't look behind it to make
[the United States] prove that they have this interest." 9 J.A.J. pled guilty to all
five charges of juvenile delinquency, and the court sentenced him to two
concurrent sentences of two years probation."°
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, J.A.J. contested the
United States Attorney's certification that a substantial federal interest warranted
the exercise of federal jurisdiction." The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that
a United States Attorney's certification that the prosecution of a juvenile
represents a substantial federal interest pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is an
unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. 2
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The HistoricalDevelopment ofFederalJuvenile JusticeLegislation
Prior to the close of the eighteenth century, children who committed state
and federal crimes were subject to the same punishment and proceedings as adult
offenders. 3 Progressive reformers, however, endorsed the notion that
rehabilitation, rather than punishment, prevents juvenile delinquents from
becoming adult offenders.14 By 1945, all state jurisdictions had created juvenile
court systems that reflected the reformists' philosophy.'
Until the last several decades, the federal government played a small role
in developing juvenile justice policies.' 6 The increase in the rate and severity of

118 S. Ct. 2388 (1998).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Joseph F. Yeckel, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal
Intervention in Juvenile Justice,51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 334 (1997).
14. See id. at 335; see also Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquentandthe Juvenile
Court: Is There Still a Placefor Rehabilitation?,25 CoNN. L. REv. 57, 65-67 (1992).

15. Yeckel, supra note 13, at 335. To promote the idea ofjuvenile protection over
punishment, juvenile court proceedings were held in private, juvenile records were
expunged once ajuvenile reached the age of majority and juveniles were released upon
rehabilitation. Yeckel, supranote 13, at 335-36.
16. See Yeckel, supra note 13, at 338; see also United States v. Juvenile Male #1,
86 F.3d 1314, 1320 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[p]rior to the 1984 amendments, §5032

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/11

2

Embley: Embley: Federal Jurisdiction over Juveniles: Who Decides

1999]

FEDERAL JURISDICTIONOVER JUVENILES

juvenile crimes in the late twentieth century led Congress to fashion a more
active federal juvenile justice system.1 7 At the same time, Congress continued
to legislate by balancing society's need to be protected from crime with society's
desire to protect its juveniles.
In 1974, Congress passed the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act ("1974 Act"). 8 The 1974 Act amended previous legislation by
changing the definition of a juvenile, 9 adding the requirement of judicial
approval before the government may prosecute juveniles as adults, placing
limits on the number of offenses for which courts may try juveniles as adults,

and providing for federal prosecution ofjuveniles when20the state would not or
could not exercise jurisdiction over a juvenile offender.
In 1984, Congress amended the 1974 Act with the passage of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act ("1984 Act").

21

The 1984 Act mandated that

juveniles be tried as adults in some cases and authorized federal prosecution of
juveniles for violent crimes or serious drug offenses if the Attorney Genera12
certified that the case held "a substantial federal interest."3 The 1984 Act
granted the federal government a wider basis for invoking jurisdiction by adding
a new basis upon which the federal government could proceed against ajuvenile

offender. 24 Restrictions, however, continued to apply; the provision was limited

embodied a clear preference for having juvenile criminal matters handled in the state
courts").
Congress enacted the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act ("FJDA") in 1938, but the
FJDA only applied to a very small group of juvenile offenders: those under the age of
eighteen who were not surrendered to state officials or charged with offenses punishable
by life imprisonment or death. See United States v. Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F. Supp. 1219,
1221 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, ch. 486,52 Stat. 764
(1938) (repealed, but provisions are contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5037 (1994 & Supp.
II 1996)).
17. Yeckel, supra note 13, at 333.
18. Federal Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and
42 U.S.C.).
19. A "juvenile" is defined as "a person who has not attained his eighteenth
birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under [the Act] for an alleged
act ofjuvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained his twenty-first birthday." 18
U.S.C. § 5031 (1994).

20. See JuvenileKJ.C., 976 F. Supp. at 1221 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5032 (1994
& Supp. 111996)); see also S. RP. No. 93-1011 (1974).
21. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976
(1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18-19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28-29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
22. The authority to certify on behalf of the Attorney General is delegated to the
appropriate United States Attorney. 28 C.F.R. § 0.57 (1998).
23. United States v. Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996). Although the current version
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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to serious violent felonies and drug-related offenses.25 In other words, Congress
continued to endorse the "essential concepts" of the 1974 Act: that juvenile
delinquency matters should generally be left to the states, and that the federal
government should assert control over ajuvenile proceeding only when an older
juvenile engages in serious criminal conduct.26
The latest amendment to the 1974 Act occurred in 1994, when Congress
passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.27 This legislation
responded to gang violence and the growing number of violent juvenile crimes.28
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act authorized the
prosecution of juveniles as young as thirteen for certain serious felonies,
including first and second degree murder, attempted murder, and bank robbery.29
The current provision of the law governing proceedings against juvenile
offenders asserts that the United States may not proceed against a juvenile in
federal court
unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the
appropriate district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile
court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction
or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to
such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have
available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles,
or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or [is
among certain specified drug and firearm offenses], and that there is
a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the
exercise of Fedeial jurisdiction.30
Once federal jurisdiction is obtained, juveniles are subject to delinquency
proceedings unless the district court determines that transfer of the juvenile for

of the law can be read to compel certification of a substantial federal interest in all cases,
legislative history reveals that the "substantial federal interest" inquiry was not intended
to supplement the first and second categories as well as become a component of the third.
United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 303 n.6 (1997) (citing S.REP. No. 98-225,
at 389 (1983)).
25. JuvenileNo. 1, 118 F.3d at 303 n.6 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 389 (1983)).
26. S.REP. No. 98-225, at 386 (1983).
27. Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15-16 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
28. Yeckel, supra note 13, at 344.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
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adult prosecution is "in the interests ofjustice,"3' or unless the district is required
to transfer the juvenile to adult status.32

One of the most troublesome aspects of the 1984 amendments involves the
court's role in the "substantial federal interest" inquiry. Is the prosecutor's
"substantial federal interest" determination subject to judicial review?

B. The MajorityPosition andAnalysis-A SubstantialFederalInterest
Certificationis Not Subject to JudicialReview
A majority of circuit courts have held that the prosecutor's "substantial
federal interest" determination is final and therefore not subject to judicial
review.33 United States v. Juvenile No. 1 outlines many of the majority's

31. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996). To determine whether the transfer
of a juvenile to adult status is in the "interest ofjustice," courts evaluate the following

factors:
[T]he age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged

offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the
juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the
nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the
availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1994 & Supp. 111996). Pursuant to Section 5032, a district
court must transfer a juvenile to adult status when:
(1) the juvenile committed the act underlying the charged offense after his
sixteenth birthday; (2) the charged offense is a felony that has as an element
the use of physical force or by its nature involves the risk of physical force,
or is an offense specifically enumerated in the paragraph; and (3) the juvenile
has previously been found guilty of a crime that would satisfy factor (2).
United States v. Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 n.8 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (citing
Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730, 732 (3d Cir. 1997)).
33. See United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 541 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
"courts cannot review the substantive basis of the Attorney General's certification of a
'substantial federal interest'); In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that courts may only review a certification to "determine its presence and
whether it facially supports... jurisdiction"); United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d
298, 300 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Attorney General's "substantial federal
interest" is notjudicially reviewable); Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730,737 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding that courts have no jurisdiction to review the substantive basis of an
Section 5032 certification, but that courts may review the certification determination for
technical defects, for whether a crime is one of violence and for whether the certification
was made in bad faith); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 511 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "in the absence of purely formal error on the face of the certification or
proof of bad faith on the part of the government,.. . certifications made in accord with
Section 5032 customarily 'must be accepted as final'). But see United States v. Juvenile
#1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1319 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that certification is reviewable); United
States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that certification is
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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arguments and underlying rationales.34 The Fifth Circuit first examined the text
and structure of 18 U.S.C. § 5032 and concluded that the text does not contain
any provision allowing judicial review of the Attorney General's certification. 5
In contrast, however, Section 5032 explicitly authorizes judicial review of the
Attorney General's motion to transfer a juvenile to an adult proceeding.36
Moreover, Juvenile No. 1 recognizes that Section 5032 neither defines the term
"substantial federal interest" nor provides standards to guide the inquiry of the
Attorney General's certification. 37 To the contrary, Section 5032 enumerates
specific factors for courts to consider in determining whether transfer of a
juvenile is in the interests of justice.38
The court explained that when "Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion."39 In other words, if Congress intended various
sections of a statute to have identical meanings, it presumably would have
expressed this intent in the statute's wording.
In addition, the court believed that Congress's omission of the definition
and criteria for judicial review of "substantial federal interest" demonstrated
intent to leave the matter solely to the discretion of federal prosecutors." As
support, the court noted that the United States Attorneys' Manual uses
"substantial federal interest" extensively to guide prosecutors in rendering
decisions on whether to prosecute a defendant in federal court.4' Juvenile No.

subject to judicial review for compliance with Section 5032 and is necessary to confer
federal jurisdiction); United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D. Va.
1994) (holding that courts may review certification decisions for more than mere
compliance with Section 5032). Some courts that follow the majority rule of substantive
nonreviewability do allow judicial review when the defendant alleges that the charged
offense was not a "crime of violence," the government filed a certification in bad faith
or the government failed to formally comply with Section 5032.
34. 118 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1997).
35. Id. at 304.
36. Id.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 305 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).

40. Id.
41. Id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-

27.230(A) (1993)). The Manual states that in determining whether the government
attorney should decline prosecution because of lack of a substantial federal interest, the
attorney should weigh all relevant factors, including:
(1) [flederal law enforcement priorities; (2) [t]he nature and seriousness of the

offense; (3) [t]he deterrent effect of prosecution; (4) [t]he persons' culpability
in connection with the offense; (5) [t]he person's history with respect to
criminal activity; (6) [t]he person's willingness to cooperate in the

investigation or prosecution of others; and (7)[t]he probable sentence or other
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/11
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1 agreed with the Supreme Court in Wayte v. United States in stating that the
factors that federal prosecutors must weigh in deciding whether to exercise
federal jurisdiction over a defendant are "not readily susceptible to the kind of
analysis the courts are competent to undertake."42

The Third Circuit provided additional evidence of the judiciary's inability
to define the contours of the types of behavior that should command the
attention of federal courts.4 3 Referring to the attempt by the Committee on Long
Range Planning for the Federal Courts to define what constitutes a substantial
federal interest, the Third Circuit stated that the Long Range Plan "ultimately
adopted provisions that are quite broad, and scarcely provide the calipers for
44
making the kind of determination for which the [minority view] would call."
The Fifth Circuit also examined the legislative history of Section 5032.
Senate Report 98-225 explains that the addition of the "substantial federal
interest" and "crime of violence" categories adopts the recommendation of the
United States Attorney General that the federal government acquire original
jurisdiction over federal crimes by juveniles. 45 Furthermore, the report states
that the addition is "substantially the same as" some of the Criminal Code
Reform legislation approved by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in
1981.46 With respect to this legislation, the committee states that "[t]he
Committee intends" and "believes it is necessary to afford the Attorney General
[the] authority" to consider factors set forth in a different section
of the statute
47
to determine the existence of a "sufficient Federal interest.,

consequences if the person is convicted.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.230(A) (1993).

42. United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 306 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 830 (1985) (stating that even when Congress has not affirmatively precluded judicial
review, "[it] is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion").
43. Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730, 736 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997).
44. Id. See also COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FED. COURTS, Rec. 4a, at 22-30
(1995).
45. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 306 (citing S. REP.No. 98-225, at 389 (1984)).
46. Impounded (JuvenileR.G.), 117 F.3d at 736 n.8 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at
389 (.1984)).
47. United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 306-07 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
S. REP.No. 97-307, at 57 (1981)). The factors that prosecutors should consider in
determining the existence of a "sufficient federal interest" include:
[T]he gravity of the Federal offense as compared to the State or local offense,
the relationship of the offense to another Federal offense committed by the
accused, and the relative likelihood of prompt and effective investigation and
prosecution by Federal, State or local authorities in light of available resources
and the nature and scope of the criminal activity involved.
Id. at 307.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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The Fifth Circuit believed, as does the Eleventh Circuit, that the report
highlights Congress's intent to immunize the Attorney General's "substantial
federal interest" decision from judicial review. 4 This reasoning is deduced from
the list of factors in the statute that a court must examine in making an "interest
of justice inquiry," as compared to the reference to a different portion
of the
49
statute to determine whether a "sufficient federal interest" exists.
In UnitedStates v. LD.P., the Eleventh Circuit addressed many of the same
arguments as United States v. Juvenile No. 1, but primarily analyzed case
precedent in its discussion of judicial reviewability of certifications.5" Holding
that certification decisions are final in the absence of formal error or proof of bad
faith, I.D.P. first recognized that courts are not always granted the power of
judicial review." Unreviewable executive decisions in connection with law
enforcement matters are commonplace within our system of government.5 2
These instances include a United States Attorney's determination that the public
interest requires a witness be compelled to testify, 3 a United States Attorney's
certification that a proceeding is against a person thought to have participated
in organized crime,5 4 and certification by a United States
Attorney that
55
interlocutory appeal is not being taken for reasons of delay.
56
The Eleventh Circuit also discussed Gutierrezde Martinez v. Lamagno,
a case where the Supreme Court analyzed the question of "who decides" in the
context of scope of employment certification under the Westfall Act. 7 Under
the Westfall Act, if the Attorney General certifies that a defendant-employee was
acting within the scope of her employment, the United States is substituted as a
defendant in a civil action,5" and the case proceeds under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. 9 The Supreme Court expressly concluded that certification was subject to
judicial review for two reasons, the first being that the Attorney General herself

48. Id. at 307. See also United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 512-13 (11th Cir.
1996).
49. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 303, 305.
50. I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 510-13.
51. Id. at 511.
52. Id. (holding that certification by Attorney General is not reviewable), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1975). This case was decided prior to the addition of the
"substantial federal interest" category.
53. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431-34 (1956).
54. United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1153-55 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.denied,
410 U.S. 984 (1973).
55. United States v. Comiskey, 460 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. 515 U.S. 417,427 (1995).
57. United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 513 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1996). For the full text
of the Westfall Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (1994).
58. I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 513 n.6.
59. Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 427.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/11
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urged review.60 Second, when the prosecutor certifies that an employee acted
within the scope of her employment, the certification disposes of the
controversy.6' When the United States becomes the defendant, a case may fall
under an exception to the government's waiver of immunity. 62 Therefore, a
prosecutor has an "incentive" to certify that a federal employee was acting
within the scope of her employment because the employee and the United States
may both be shielded against liability. The plaintiff, however, is left without a
remedy. LD.P.stated that neither of these circumstances exists in a "substantial
federal interest" determination. 63
The Federal Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, following the
majority view, declared that review by the judicial branch of such "executive
decisions" is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 64 The court stated
that requiring review "assumes that only judges can discern the meaning of
statutes, a view that is at odds with our three-part constitutional structure," for
the Constitution mandates that the Executive "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed." 61 The court added that the Executive is faced with
defendants who violate both state and federal laws and has developed expertise
to make decisions on whether to prosecute.' Why is the Executive less capable
of reading, interpreting, and applying statutes than the courts?67 To the contrary,
the court believed that "[t]here is nothing nugatory about congressional
efforts
' 68
to provide guidance to the Executive directly via statutory language.
Finally, the majority claims that their position has congressional support,
as both Houses of Congress are currently considering legislation that would
amend 18 U.S.C. § 5032 to clarify that "substantial federal interest"
certifications are not subject to judicial review.69 The House of Representatives
passed a version of the71legislation,70 and "the Senate is actively deliberating
about another version.",

60. I.D.P., 102 F.3d at 513 n.6.
61. Id.
62. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 427 (1955).
63. United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 513 n.6 (1lth Cir. 1996). The court

explained that, unlike Lamagno, the Attorney General did not urge review and had no
incentive to certify. Id. Furthermore, the decision to certify was not determinative of a
transfer decision, and therefore did not dispose of the juvenile's appeal. Id.
64. In re Sealed Case, 131 F.3d 208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
65. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730, 733 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997).
70. Id. See also Juvenile Crime Control Act of 1997, H.R. 3, 105th Cong. § 101

(1997).
71. Juvenile R.G., 117 F.3d at 733 n.2. See also Violent and Repeat Juvenile
Offender Act of 1997, S. 10, 105th Cong. § 102(a) (1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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C. The Minority Position andAnalysis-A SubstantialFederalInterest
Certificationis Subject to JudicialReview
A slight minority of courts take a different approach and conclude that
certification based upon a "substantial federal interest" is subject to judicial
review. 72 These courts rely heavily upon the maxim that lack of a specific
provision in regard to judicial review of executive action is in and of itself no bar
to review.' In fact, there is a "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial
review."'74 This presumption is rebutted only by evidence revealing that
Congress intended to preclude judicial review.75
According to the Supreme Court in Gutierrezde Martinez v. Lamagno, the
presumption ofjudicial review is difficult to rebut because courts must accept
that Congress's silence authorizes executive decisions "without any judicial
check. 76 Furthermore, Lamagno believed that denial of the power to review
"cast[s] Article III judges in the role of petty functionaries," ' assigned to only
7
"rubber-stamp work.

1

The courts in the minority, such as the Fourth Circuit, also rely on the
history of the 1984 amendments to Section 5032 to support their holdings.
Before these amendments, Section 5032 "embodied a clear preference" for state
courts to handle juvenile matters, emphasizing rehabilitative rather than punitive
measures.79 Federal courts would get involved only when the state either would
not, could not, or should not handle the case, from a juvenile's perspective."0

72: See United States v. Juvenile Male #1,86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Male Juvenile, 844

F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1994).
73. See Juvenile Male #1,86 F.3d at 1317; Juvenile Male, 923 F.2d at 617; Male
Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. at 281.
74. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319-20 (citations omitted). See also Bowen v.

Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (holding that
Congress did not provide the Secretary of Health and Huinan Services with absolute nonreviewable authority to promulgate Medicare distribution regulations); Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
75. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 424 (1995) (holding that
Congress did not provide the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare with nonreviewable authority to promulgate prescription drug labeling regulations) (citing Abbott
Labs., 387 U.S. at 140).
76. Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 426.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 429.
79. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1320 (4th Cir. 1996).
80. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss1/11
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The addition of the "substantial federal interest" prong, however, expanded the
possibility of invoking federal jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the minority circuit courts emphasize that the focus of Section
5032 remains rehabilitative and embodies a preference for treatment at the state
level.8 2 To support this contention, Juvenile Male No.1 looked to Senate Report
98-225, which states in part that "[t]he essential concepts of the [1974 Act] are
that juvenile delinquency matters should generally [be] handled by the States
and that criminal prosecution ofjuveniles offenders should be reserved for only
those cases involving particularly serious conduct by older juvenile. The
Committee continues to endorse these concepts ....

,,s

Therefore, judicial

review is necessary to ensure that the traditional role of federalism is properly
preserved in the area of juvenile crime."
By requiring certification by the Attorney General, minority courts also
believe that Congress stressed the importance of careful consideration with
respect to the decision to place a juvenile under federal jurisdiction.85 In a
concurring opinion in Impounded (JuvenileR. G.), Judge Weis contrasts this to
a federal prosecutor's decision to indict an adult who also violated state law. 6

In such a situation, the prosecutor enjoys essentially unfettered discretion.87
Judge Weis asserted that Congress inserted the certification requirement with
respect to juvenile prosecutions to remind prosecutors of the important state
interest in prosecuting juveniles in state courts.88
Judge Weis also contrasted the experience and expertise of federal judges
to that of federal prosecutors. He explained that because federal courts carry
diverse caseloads, they are more familiar with the "complexities of
federalism."8 9 Therefore, Congress necessarily would grant the judiciary the
final word in cases involving federalism concerns, rather than leaving the final
decision to local United States Attorneys. To prove the validity of this
assumption, Judge Weis referred to a predecessor bill9" that contained a
provision barring judicial review of certifications. 9' This provision was

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1320 n.9 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 386 (1984)).
84. Id. at 1321. See also Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730, 739 (3d Cir.
1997) (Weis, J., concurring) (stating that judicial review is necessary to insure that
principles of federalism are not "jeopardized by overzealous federal prosecution").
85. Juvenile R.G., 117 F.3d at 740 (Weis, J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981, S. 1630, 97th Cong. (1981); see also
S. REP. No. 97-307 (1981).
91. Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730, 741 (3d Cir. 1997) (Weis, J.,
concurring).
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removed, revealing congressional intent to reject the proposal to prohibit judicial
review of certification decisions.92
The minority of courts that uphold judicial review of certification decisions
believe that federal courts have the duty and expertise to review such
determinations. These courts rely not only on the presumption that Congress
intends judicial review, but also on legislative history and precedent.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the sufficiency of the
United States Attorney's certification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is not subject
to judicial oversight because of the discretionary nature of the Attorney's
decision. 93 Although the court recognized that executive actions are
presumptively subject to judicial review, the court implied that executive
decisions regarding whether to prosecute overcome the presumption and rest
entirely within prosecutor discretion.94
The Eighth Circuit also examined the "text and structure" of Section 5032
to determine Congress's intent regarding judicial review of the Attorney's
certification that federal prosecution serves a substantial federal interest. 95 The
court stated that to determine intent, courts must examine the statute in its
entirety as well as other facts "that may illuminate Section 5032's purpose,"
such as financial incentives for certification, whether a decision to certify is
dispositive of the controversy, and whether the statute provides meaningful
96
standards against which to review the Attorney's certification decision.
In analyzing the structure and text of Section 5032, the court signaled a
distinction between a United States Attorney's motion to transfer a juvenile to
adult court and the Attorney's certification of a substantial federal interest.97 The
motion to transfer is expressly subject to judicial review and the provision
contains specific standards for review, whereas the Attorney's decision to certify
contains no provision indicating whether judicial review is allowed and no
standard against which a court may evaluate the Attorney's decision.93 The court
stated that Congress's decision to allow judicial review of transfers but not of
certification of a substantial federal interest is "powerful evidence that judicial
review of the latter is barred." 99 Furthermore, Congress's decision to provide

92. Id.
93. United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905, 906-07 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 2388 (1998).
94. Id. at 909.
95. Id. at 907.
96. Id. at 907.
97. Id. at 908.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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standards for judicial review oftransfers, but not for substantial federal interest
certification decisions, is fatal to the argument for reviewability.'0
The court further noted that while Congress did not provide standards for

courts to use in evaluating the existence of a substantial federal interest, the
Department of Justice provided such standards for prosecutors.'0 ' These
standards address when prosecutors should decline to prosecute adult offenders
for lack of a substantial federal interest-exactly the type of determination

vested in the executive, not the judicial, branch. 2
The court explained that the Attorney General and the United States
Attorneys require broad discretion to enforce federal laws because a statute
designates them as the President's delegates. 3 This designation requires that
they aid4 the President in his constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the
laws."
Finally, concurring with Chief Judge Wilkinson, who disagreed with the
Fourth Circuit's finding of reviewability, the court foresaw the possibility of
interbranch conflict and judicial inefficiency. 0 5 If certification of a substantial
federal interest was subject to judicial review, a district court may not only
repudiate the Attorney General's policy determination by subjectively deciding
that the case does not merit federal jurisdiction, but may also be required to reevaluate the government's reasons for invoking federal jurisdiction in potentially
every juvenile proceeding in federal court.' 6
V. COMMENT
The decision reached by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is clearly in
step with the mainstream judicial response to the issue, but the result is less than
satisfying. Like the majority of federal circuit courts, this court relies on the
statutory language and nature of the certification decision to hold that
certification of a substantial federal interest is not subject to judicial review.
However, legislative history and statutory interpretation reveal convincing
grounds to permit judicial review of the certification decision.
The Senate Report that accompanies the criminal legislation acknowledges
the need to leave criminal prosecution ofjuveniles to the states, unless the states
are incapable of asserting control over the juvenile, or unless the need to assert
federal jurisdiction is "based on a finding that the nature of the offense or the

100. Id.
101. Id. at 908-09.

102. Id. at 909.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 909 n.3.

106. Id. at 909.
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circumstances of the case give rise to special federal concerns."'0 7 Not only
must prosecutors be hesitant to assert federal jurisdiction, but courts must
supervise prosecutor certification determinations so that federal jurisdiction is
not needlessly or carelessly invoked. If courts fail to review certification

decisions, "[e]venhanded administration of criminal justice would suffer
whenever the choice between charging a defendant in federal or state court
would depend.., on the 0relative
ambitions of federal and state prosecutors who
8
share dual jurisdiction."'
The report lists several examples of offenses that fall under the
classification of involving a "substantial federal interest." These offenses
include an assault on, or assassination of, a federal official, aircraft hijacking, a
kidnapping where state boundaries are crossed, a major espionage or sabotage
offense, participation in large-scale drug trafficking, or significant and willful
destruction of federal property.'O Furthermore, the Committee on Long Range
Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States recommends clear
standards against which a "substantial federal interest" can be measured."'
Crimes dissimilar to these offenses cannot concern a "substantial federal

107. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 386 (1984); see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMM., REPORT OF THE FED. STUDY COMM. 160 (1990) (stating that "[b]oth the principles
of federalism and the long term health of the federal judicial system require returning the
federal courts to their proper, limited role in dealing with crime").
108. Douglas E. Abrams, CrimeLegislationAnd the PublicInterest: Lessons From
Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REy. 33, 81 (1996).
109. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 389 (1984).
110. In its Proposed Long Range Plan, the Judicial Conference Committee
recommended:
Congress should allocate criminal jurisdiction to the federal courts only in
relation to the following five types of offenses:
(a) The proscribed activity constitutes an offense against the federal
government itself or against its agents, or against interests unquestionably
associated with a national government; or Congress has evinced a clear
preference for uniform federal control over this activity ....
(b) The proscribed activity involves substantial multinational or
international aspects....
(c) The proscribed activity, even if focused within a single state,
involves a complex commercial or institutional enterprise most effectively
prosecuted by use of federal resources or expertise ....
(d) The proscribed activity involves serious, high-level or widespread
state or local government corruption, thereby tending to undermine public
confidence in the effectiveness of local prosecutors and judicial systems to
deal with the matter ....
(e) The proscribed activity, because it raises highly sensitive issues in
the local community, is perceived as being more objectively within the federal
system ....
COMMITrEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PROPOSED

LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FED. COURTS, Rec. 4a, at 22-30 (1995).
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interest." Despite the majority view that Congress failed to provide the courts
with standards against which to evaluate a prosecutor's certification decision, the
examples in the Senate Report, as well as those recommended by the.Committee,
serve as "helpful guideposts" to which the courts may refer in reviewing
certification determinations."'
Furthermore, there is no indication that Congress intended these guideposts
to instruct prosecutors' decisions, but not the courts'.! 2 To the contrary, the
legislative history explicitly states that "the Federal government will continue
to defer to State authorities for less serious juvenile offenses," thus indicating an
intent to limit the federal prosecutor's authority in the juvenile delinquency
setting."' This is an area in which Congress reasonably could expect the courts'
perspective to be more objective than that of the United States Attorneys." 4
In addition, the majority of circuits deny review of the certification process
based on the reasoning that courts are ill-suited to determine what may or may
not-constitute a "substantial federal interest."" 5 These courts imply that United
States Attorneys are better able to apply Section 5032 despite the absence of
standards, but that courts are unable to cope with the task of review in similar
circumstances."16
VI. CONCLUSION
One of Congress's recent responses to the rise in violent juvenile crime is
embodied in the 1984 legislation that imposes federal jurisdiction upon juveniles

who commit serious violent or drug related crimes if the United States Attorney
certifies that the case involves "a substantial federal interest." Although the
majority of circuit courts hold that United States Attorneys should make the final
decision based upon the language, structure, and history of 18 U.S.C. § 5032,
ultimately these factors weigh in favor of the minority position-that certification
of a substantial federal interest is subject to judicial review. Until the United
States Supreme Court resolves the question, however, the external and internal
division among the circuits will continue.
ALICIA K. EMBLEY
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